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The overall theme of this paper is increasing knowledge of the evolution of 
Chinese priorities and strategy since the Korean War, and how the evolution of China’s 
relationships reveals changes in priorities. Why were these partnerships entered into on 
the part of China?  What was China’s strategic thinking?  How do strengths and 
weaknesses in these partnerships reflect China’s changing priorities?  To attempt to 
answer these questions, three case studies are used to reveal and analyze changes: Sino-
North Korean relations since the Korean War, Sino-Russian relations after the end of the 
Cold War, and Chinese participation (relations with member states) in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization.  Consideration in this paper will also be given to the future 
stability of China’s involvement with Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
"…No amount of stealthy diplomatic posturing can obscure the fact that 
China is growing more powerful and more assertive by the day, and in the 
process, a new world order is being shaped.  Lest anyone suspect hostility in 
this rebuttal of China’s new line, one hastens to add that this is exactly the way 
it should be. China obviously constitutes a huge slice of humanity. It has an 
exceptionally long history of power on the world stage, against which the last 
two centuries of relative weakness are a mere blip. And like any fast- rising 
power, its re-emergence will change the rules of the game."1
China today is recognized in the global community as a rising power with 
incredible potential.  Chinese rapid economic growth is impressive and continues each 
year, seemingly unstoppable in its progress.  China’s role in the international community 
is growing ever more involved, both bi-laterally and multi-laterally.  Regionally, the 
same is true as the country can celebrate membership in many regional organizations. 
China, however, was not always in this position of growing prominence.  Questions 
remain about China’s rise and positioning as it pursues strategic partnerships to 
accomplish goals of major growth and success.  How did China work its way from 
isolation to integration?  How has China utilized partnerships with other countries and 
involvement in regional organizations to advance its position?  How have strategic goals 
1 Herald French, “Letter from China: Is It A ‘Peaceful Rise’? U.S. Shouldn’t Bet On It,” 
The International Herald Tribune, April 20, 2006, 
http://www.howardwfrench.com/archives/2006/04/21/letter_from_china_is_it_a_peaceful
_rise_us_shouldnt_bet_on_it/ (accessed September 3, 2008).    
1
shifted over time, changing from the pursuit of Communist revolution to Capitalist 
reform and economic growth?  In considering these broad questions about China’s 
growth, more specific questions arise about China’s relationships since the Korean War.
What happened to the strength of the Chinese-North Korean partnership?  Is the 
post Cold-War Chinese-Russian partnership built on similar fragile ground or is it here to 
stay? Will China’s relations with Russia and the SCO have the same unfriendly end as 
the Chinese-North Korean relationship?   How has China utilized these relationships to 
accomplish strategic goals?  How do these relationships reveal China’s changing 
priorities?  These questions and more will be considered throughout this paper, utilizing 
three case studies to discuss China’s changing priorities and behavior – Sino-North 
Korean relations since the Korean War, Sino-Russian relations post-Cold War, and 
Chinese involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
The first section analyzes China’s relationship with North Korea, showing how 
the country eventually no longer satisfied buffer zone requirements and came to be in a 
position to potentially jeopardize China’s promising development and future.  Also 
lacking in this relationship was any economic opportunity, an increasingly important 
aspect of Chinese domestic and global policy.  It is worth examining China’s behavioral 
and policy changes toward North Korea will clearly illustrate the shift in China’s 
priorities over time, justifying the Chinese government’s change to deepening relations 
with Russia and the development of the SCO.  This analysis gives the reader an increased 
understanding of how China has planned and reacted over time, to add to the 
understanding of where the roots lie for present government policy decisions and where 
2
China wants to go in terms of the international system.  The purpose of this paper though 
is not to make predictions concerning China’s future role, but rather analyze past and 
current positioning to track China’s changing strategic priorities.  
Illustrating most clearly China’s shift from isolation to regional (and global) player 
is its behavior toward North Korea.  According to the historical tradition of Sino-North 
Korean relations, their relationship was as close as lips to teeth.2  China utilized North 
Korea’s strategic position as a buffer zone to keep the United States’ influence in China 
during the Cold War as limited as possible: “The United States was cast in the role of leader 
of imperialism, and the common struggle was against American imperialism.”3  However, 
since the Cold War ended, China’s priorities where North Korea is concerned have been 
changing.  Although the China-North Korea relationship has persisted despite repeated 
stresses and crises, relations now are fraught with tension and at an all-time low.4 China’s 
2 Scott Zhou, “All Lips and Teeth – For Now,” Asia Times Online, October 21, 2006, 
Saturday, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ21Ad01.html (accessed September 20, 
2008).   For a discussion of Chinese-North Korean relations, from good to bad, please 
also see Kosuke Takahashi, “China’s Worsening North Korean Headache,” Online  
Nautilus Institute Policy Forum, (February 8, 2005), 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0510A_Takahashi.html (accessed September 1, 
2008).  
3 Harold M. Vinacke, “Communist China and the Uncommitted Zone.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 362, (November 1965): 113.  It is 
worth perusing his entire article as the role of Anti-Americanism in Chinese policy is 
explored.
4 Takahashi (2005).  For additional commentary please see Carin Zissis, “China's 
Relationship with a Nuclear North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder 
Online, October 24, 2006, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11791/chinas_relationship_with_a_nuclear_north_korea.h
tml (accessed November 11, 2008).  Part of the article is available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2006/china-061024-cfr01.htm 
(accessed December 1, 2008).
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behavior toward North Korea since the Korean War most clearly reveals the changes in 
Beijing’s strategic prioritization.  An analysis of the Sino-North Korean relationship will 
allow for a complete understanding of the changes in Chinese external policy behavior and 
prioritization since the Korean War.  This will provide for greater depth of understanding of 
what drove China’s reengagement of Russia and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. 
Chinese-North Korean Relations: Big Changes
Although China began the relationship as an ardent supporter of North Korea, the 
relationship has shifted from one of a Korean tributary state providing for China to the 
latter, the Chinese providing for both sustenance and survival in North Korea.  During a 
2006 visit to Beijing, Chairman Kim Jung-il is described as the one arriving with “empty 
suitcases” to be filled instead of offering gifts of his own.5  It is worth exploring how the 
relationship came to be at this place, with a desperate Kim Jong-Il completely reliant 
upon a more and more hesitant provider, China.  It is also necessary to understand the 
changing Chinese priorities, for had China remained unchanged so too would the 
relationship with North Korea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may never 
have come to fruition.  The strength of ties can be partly indicated by the willingness of 
China to support North Korea with not only aid but military force if necessary (a desire 
that is waning at best).  This is a completely different policy direction than when China 
5 Scott Snyder, “Kim Jong-il Pays Tribute to Beijing – In His Own Way,” Comparative 
Connections E-Journal Online (April 2006): 109, 
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0601qchina_korea.pdf (accessed October 28, 2008).
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first condoned the relationship by defending North Korea in the Korean War.  It must be 
noted throughout history that although China has supported North Korea, it has done so 
primarily when it is in the best interest of the Chinese state or when China was too weak 
to take a strong position.  So, how did China get to be in a place where military defense 
of North Korea is not considered a viable option?  When were relationship ties first 
solidified and how solid were the foundations of the partnership?  Why is the relationship 
currently so tense?  
Choosing North Korea: Paramount Considerations 
Chairman Mao controlled government decisions entirely leading up to the Korean 
War.6  As Chairman Mao considered Chinese involvement, his philosophical mindset was 
that “conflict didn’t require a solution, it was the solution to political problems.  Hence 
politics and international affairs were processes by which contradictions on any level 
were resolved with conflict…[feeling that] conflict in human affairs was not only 
inevitable but also desirable.  Harmony was transitory and undesirable.”7  These 
6 See Kim Jae Chang and William H. Mott IV, The Philosophy of Chinese Military  
Culture (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006) for a very thorough explanation of the 
development of the philosophical underpinnings of Chinese military culture. The time 
period of Chairman Mao’s leadership and the centralization of decision-making are well 
analyzed.  See also the explanation of China’s external relations by Lowell Dittmer, “The 
Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Regional Cooperation and its Enemies in  
Northeast Asia: The Impact of Domestic Forces, ed. Edward Friedman and Sung Chull 
Kim (London: Routledge, 2006), 103.
7 See The Nature of Conflict section of Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and 
Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
http://0-www.ciaonet.org/bianca.penlib.du.edu/book/katzenstein/katz07.html (accessed 
November 13, 2008). 
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Realpolitik considerations, ensuring a degree of influence for the Chinese state, kept 
North Korea as a priority on the agenda.  Two threads running through Chinese strategic 
thinking at this time were the concept of flexibility and “just war,”8 describing the 
morally permissible killing of people for the “greater good.”9 Confucian standards, also 
important, were responsible for Chairman Mao’s recognition that China’s Tao (military 
capability) was inferior to that of the United States.10  Despite the unequal military 
prowess, China’s intervention was felt to be righteous and triumphant.11  Sun Tzu 
described flexibility as a goal in Chinese philosophical strategic involvement in war: “…
Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.”12 
 
8 China could legitimately enter this war from a Chinese philosophical perspective 
because according to Chinese “just war” theory, entering a conflict as the weaker nation 
fighting the strong, automatically put China on the morally permissible side of the 
conflict.  For an extremely thorough discussion of Chinese philosophical analysis, 
theoretical and philosophical, toward “just war” in Chinese theory and practice please 
read Nadine Godehardt, “The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the 
Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China,” GIGA German Institute of Global  
and Area Studies Working Paper Series 88 (2008), 1-38, 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/gig/wpaper/88.html (accessed September 29, 2008).  Pay 
particular attention to sections 2 and 3.
9 Johnston (1996): 231.  
10 Chang and Mott (2006): 107.
11 Johnston (1996): 69-70.  See also Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002): 4, 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/culture.pdf (accessed August 20, 2008).  
  
12 See Sun Tzu, Art of War, Lionel Giles (Allandale Online Publishing: 1910).  Online 
access to the entire work can be found at http://www.yuni.com/library/suntzu.htm 
(accessed September 4, 2008).  Pay particular attention to Chapter 6: Weak Points and 
Strong. 
6
Therefore, a country must be prepared to deal with changing conditions at all times and 
strategize to endure through them, all the while accomplishing the goals set.  
China has shown through history to have a very adept ability to react to constantly 
changing conditions, no doubt due to the constant need to weigh several competing 
internal conditions with an equal set of compelling external concerns.  In that vein of 
thought, Sun Tzu’s philosophy of Tao (military capability) and Shih (national solidarity), 
factored heavily into government considerations of Marxian philosophies.13  No doubt an 
influence upon considerations for war was the tutoring of Guo Huaruo, who “stressed that 
from a Marxist-Leninist perspective the notion of ‘not fighting and subduing the 
enemy’—the core of the conventional interpretation of Sun Tzu—was un-Marxist.”14 
This was a consideration that weighed heavily.  Therefore, the Chinese government felt 
China must enter the conflict: “American military actions threaten[ed] China’s industrial 
base in Manchuria” and also “counterrevolutionaries could…undermine [China’s] 
tenuous political control of the mainland.”15  Eventually, the Chinese government agreed 
13 Chang and Mott (2006): 107.
14 Guo Huaruo, “’Sun Zi [sic] zhu’ qian yan” [Preface to “Translation and annotation of 
Sun Zi”], in Gua Huaruo, Guo Huaruo junshi lunwen xuanji [Guo Huaruo’s Selected 
Essays on Military Affairs] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1989): 427, as cited in 
Nadine Godehardt, “Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy 
of the People’s Republic of China,” GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies  
Working Paper Series 88 (2008), 232.  In this case, I had to rely upon Nadine 
Godehardt’s translation and citation of this work, as I currently lack the Chinese language 
ability to read and translate the text directly.  
15 Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The 
Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 122-
57.
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to enter the conflict, believing then, as it does now, that “enduring external threats to 
China…emanat[e] from Washington” and must be taken care of despite the human and 
monetary cost of war.16  The justification that Beijing entered the war on the side of the 
just was icing on the cake in the pursuit of one of Beijing’s mot important priorities – a 
buffer between China and the United States.17  
 In China’s decision to support North Korea, just war theory placed China on the 
side of the defender, the morally correct side.  This helped to mediate the fact that 
China’s military weakness made all the more threatening the strength of the United States 
on the battlefield.  Another consideration is that China may have been predisposed to 
military force at the time, perhaps due to the belief that war was not just inevitable, but 
was to be pursued.18  Therefore, China was perhaps not so much defending North Korea 
as much as the future of the Communist movement, seen as essential to China at the time. 
It is this weakness, perhaps, which eventually led to the tense relations between North 
Korea and China that can be seen today.  Prior to 1978, China thought that war would 
16 Andrew Scobell (2002): 27.  See also Andrew Scobell’s  “Soldiers, Statesman, 
Strategic Culture and China’s 1950 Intervention in Korea,” Journal of Contemporary 
China 8, no. 22 (1999): 477-497, for additional discussion of China’s rationale prior to 
entry in the Korean War.  
17 It is interesting to note here that India argued at this time in favor of China’s just entry 
into the war, and that China was simply defending its border interests.  Please see the 
Truce Talks section of this article for a short discussion of India’s declarations regarding 
China’s entry into the Korean War support of North Korea.  Robert T. Oliver, “A Brief 
for Korea,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 294 (July 
1954), 35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1029226 (accessed October 15, 2005).
18 Scobell (2002): 109.  Please consult this article as a whole for an excellent explanation 
of the Chinese belief about the importance of war in international relations. 
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occur regardless, and that Chinese involvement was important to international 
involvement,19 believing it to be a result of China equating Communist class struggle and 
revolution with the modus operandi in the international system.20  Prevailing elements in 
the decision were China’s need for a buffer zone, the manifestations of ideological 
concerns into policy, and just war theory.  These elements all played a role in justifying 
for the Chinese government’s entry into the Korean War and defense of North Korea. 
China, North Korea, and the International Community
Also of consideration was China’s positioning in the global community. 
Partnering with North Korea would allow China to begin establishing legitimacy as a 
country of rising influence, one the United States should be concerned about as a 
potentially challenging power, or at least as a potentially equal member of the 
international community.21  Chinese strategy toward North Korea evolved through several 
cycles, beginning during the period of the Korean War in China’s policy of leaning to one 
side.22  In the beginning of the Cold War, the constraints of the current international 
19 Qin YaQing, “National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security interests: Three 
Hypotheses on the Interaction between China and International Society,” in China and 
Asia’s Security: China in the Globalized World Series 1 (Marshall Cavendish 
International: Singapore, 2005): 39.
20 Qin (2005): 39.
21 Chang and Mott (2006): 109.  
22 For a discussion of China’s “lean to one side” policy, see Joseph Y.S. Cheng and 
Zhang Wankun. “Patterns and Dynamics of China’s International Strategic Behavior,” in 
Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao 
(London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 180.
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system gave China some recognition and influence, although at this point China’s role 
was largely that of a bystander. 
China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,23 were designated as a baseline 
for interaction with international community members. These guidelines and principles 
increasingly came to encompass the whole of China’s external relations: “mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”24  In this 
case, coupled with China’s current inward focus and revolutionary zeal, this treaty was 
designed to ensure continued border security.  In addition, China made several other 
declarations of a desire for peace just after the Korean War, shifting attention from 
external involvement in war to internal reform. The Constitution of 1954 emphasized "the 
steadfast policy of our country in international affairs is to work hard for the lofty goal of 
world peace and progress for mankind;” the current 1982 Constitution, equally affirms an 
effort to "safeguard world peace and promote the cause of human progress."25  China’s 
23 These principles were enacted specifically for China’s interactions with India at the 
time, but it can be said that these principles characterize China’s policy toward all nations 
since their establishment.
24 Jiang Zhuqing, “’Five Principles’ Still Shaping Global Peace,” China Daily Online, 
June 29, 2004, Tuesday, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
06/29/content_343578.htm (accessed September 25, 2008).  
25 “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” White Paper (Beijing: Information Office of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995) http://www.nti.org/
db/China/engdocs/whteppr.htm (accessed on September 14, 2008).  Also see “China’s 
Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, White Paper, 
(Beijing, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 
September 2004) http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140320.htm (accessed 
on September 15, 2008). 
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refocusing byline away from involvement in the Korean War toward internal reform was 
in stark contrast to North Korea.  
China’s involvement in the war satisfied the current ideological importance of the 
Communist movement: “the cause of the revolution had all along developed out of 
nothing, gone from small to big, developed as a brutal, difficult, death-defying struggle.26 
However, the Communist ideology (and the global revolutions encouraged by the 
movement) would not always be held in high esteem.  China was beginning to shift 
toward a line of strategic thinking that began to devalue a strategic partnership with North 
Korea, a partnership that had been solidified in the first place to protect China as much as 
or more than North Korea.    
China’s Entry into the World Arena: The Post-Mao Era
Before the Korean War, China was suffering economically and experienced little 
stability, internal or external.  Due to this, leaders in Beijing seized upon the Korean War 
as an opportunity to unite the people internally in the Chinese cause and pave the way for 
internal growth and stability.  By 1958, “the mainland of China is under the firm control 
of a powerful government, making rapid progress in industrializing key sectors of its 
economy, undergoing widespread social change under forced draft, and possessed of 
Asia’s paramount military force.”27  As China began securing the underpinnings of 
26 Liu Zhen, Liu Zhen Huiyilu,(Liu Zhen’s Memoirs), (Beijing: PLA Press, 1990), 337.
 
27 John M. H. Lindbeck, “The China Problem Today,” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 321 (January 1959), 10, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1030975 (accessed on September 6, 2008).
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domestic growth and reform, external considerations were also made, but only pursued 
when directly in line with Chinese national interest and upon the grounds that China 
wanted no internal interference from an external power.  
Prior to the 1970s it can generally be agreed upon that China was largely excluded 
from inter-governmental organizations in any sphere.  With China’s entry into the United 
Nations in 1971, a great sign of complete reversal of the total isolationism of the 1966-68 
Cultural Revolution, China began to seek equal recognition in the international arena on a 
basic scale, solidifying its new direction away from North Korea.  According to the 
Chinese government, China did not seek to become a leader in the global community, 
having no desire to make itself the target of any threatened nation: “China will never be a 
superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.”28  Chinese 
capabilities were still developing, and in no position to be challenged or targeted, and so 
China was content to move slowly in policy, to ensure their growing position.  
During Chairman Mao’s control of government policy, involvement in 
organizations such as the United Nations, and policies of a similar nature (encouraging 
external involvement) were discouraged.  As China moved into the next decade, a new 
principle of “seeking truth from facts (shishi quishi)” was established, moving away from 
28 Albert Feuerwerker, “Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary 
China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 402, no. 1, (July 
1972), 3, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/402/1/1 (accessed on September 21, 
2008).  China’s actions post-Cold War, seeking a multilateral world order, can be 
strongly seen in this 1972 statement.  China utilized the conditions of the international 
system after 1989 turning this thought into action through policy, explained in future 
pages.  
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an ideological focus.29  Another key indicator of this shift is the disappearance by 1971 of 
Lin Piao, author of the “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” manifesto of 1965, 
reflecting a new belief that his writing was “intellectually absurd and politically 
impractical.”30  This demonstrates the mood in the political leadership was changing and 
that new thinkers were being brought in for a different leadership direction and focus.
Leadership in Beijing shifted to the Central Committee Secretariat and State 
Council, away from the politburo, meaning for the Chinese government a collectivization 
of decision-making and less influence from the “whims of an individual leader.”31  This 
new focus is described as “prompting the vision of a peaceful future world as the way 
toward the promised land of modernity.”32  In this line of thinking, Chinese political 
thought has moved from the Communist revolutionary line that war is inevitable, to a 
preference of focused domestic development.   In the words of Deng Xiaoping, China 
should “bide [its] time and build up…capabilities.”33  With Beijing’s new Open Door 
29 Samuel S. Kim, “Thinking Globally in Post-Mao China,” Journal of Peace Research 
27, no. 2 (May 1990).  The research of Samuel S. Kim provides excellent analysis of this 
new principle to seek truth in facts rather than ideology.
30 Feuerwerker (1972): 10.
31 David L. Shambaugh, “China’s National Security Research Bureaucracy,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 110 (June 1987), 284, http://www.jstor.org/stable/654000 (accessed on 
September 30, 2008).
32 Kim (1990): 194.
33 Ralph D. Sawyer, “Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections,” Journal  
of Military and Strategic Studies 9, no. 2 (Winter 2006/2007), 3, 
www.jmss.org/2007/2007winter/articles/sawyer_cont-defence.pdf (accessed on 
September 27, 2008).
13
Policy, launched by Deng Xiaoping, China began to ascend to a new global and regional 
stature as a country on the move.  It is worth noting that North Korea during this period 
maintained its prior status quo, refusing to change as China was with the times and 
modernize.  Whereas North Korea’s policy remained resistant to reform, China’s 
flexibility through time meant that their government policies could change and shift with 
the times in order to secure continued growth.  
In the 1980s China began to get more proactive in these organizations, moving 
beyond just membership into a more responsive role.  China focused upon “system-
maintaining and system-exploiting…Beijing began to ask what IGOs could do for 
China…and was more and more concerned with the stability of the existing capitalist 
world system as a sine qua non for fueling its modernization drive.”34  Beijing only 
increased its role in international organizations, in particular the United Nations, which 
China declared a successful way to maintain stable world peace.  China additionally 
applied for membership on the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, with 
the encouragement of the Soviet Union.35  North Korea, ever the reclusive nation, sought 
none of these advances and continued the status quo, resisting reform and making its 
relationship with China increasingly tense.  Chinese policy had slowly made China part 
of the international community in a responsible manner, taking part in international 
institutions and paying more attention to the rules governing the global system.  North 
Korea continued to travel in the opposite direction and by this point both countries were 
34 Kim (1990): 193.
35 Kim (1990): 196.
14
very far apart in terms of goals, policies, and strategic focus.  Relations between the two 
countries were tenuous at best, and China began to look elsewhere for partnership to 
satisfy its goals post-Cold War.  
15
CHAPTER 2
Change in the 1990s: A Fleeting Alliance 
China’s focus shifted to a new “ism” between their entry into the Korean War and 
the first North Korean nuclear declaration, refocusing upon the goal of capitalism instead 
of communism: the “export of revolution” morphed into a solid “peace and development” 
baseline, the beginnings of which could be seen in the Five Basic Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence.   With a new economic focus, China sought partnerships with those who 
would be most advantageous to the internal development of the country.36  The current 
structure of the system also allowed China to begin building relations with others based 
upon “‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful diplomacy,’ regardless of the ideology of the other 
government.37  It was not a question of choosing sides as in the Cold War, but now a 
focus on working together with anyone and everyone who could benefit China’s goal of 
economic growth and power.  Therefore, China integrated into international sphere 
beyond membership in international organizations by engaging countries bilaterally and 
multilaterally, at the cost of solid relations with North Korea.38 China was slowly setting 
36 Dittmer (2006): 101.
37 Dittmer (2006): 109.
38 Stephanie Hsien and Chae-Jin Lee, “China's Two-Korea Policy at Trial: The Hwang 
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in, getting more comfortable, and finding its place in the new international order, and the 
shift away from North Korea is a strong indicator of this taking place.39  The Chinese 
government’s responsible policies were making North Korea’s irresponsible policies, and 
failing economy as a result, all the more threatening to the growth and security of China.
China also began to restructure internal strategic priorities.  Ideological 
considerations took a backseat to rising issues of national development and security 
initiatives.40  The new “ideology” for China was capitalism clothed in the rhetoric of a 
Communist government.  The political process in Beijing continued decentralization, 
increasing policy dialogue in a multi-layered way, opening the political process in a way 
that would have never been envisioned possible during the Mao period.41 Jiang Zemin 
described this phenomenon, saying that “channels of decision making have become 
increasingly diversified and complex—we find, for example, that the circle of decision 
makers has grown progressively wider, as new talent and new ideas have been 
Chang Yop Crisis,” Pacific Affairs 74, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 321, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030851X%28200123%2974%3A3%3C321%3ACTPATT
%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 (accessed on October 7, 2008).
39 Robert G. Sutter, “China’s Modernization and Asian Security,” in China’s Global  
Presence: Economics, Politics, and Security, ed. David M. Lampton and Catherine H 
Keyser (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington, 1988), 
205.
40 Sutter (1988): 206.
41 David Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making process: Is it 
Changing and Does It Matter?” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in  
the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2001): 12.  
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incorporated via the Leading Small Groups.”42  A key indicator of the Chinese 
government taking the focus off inevitable war was the lessening influence of the 
People’s Liberation Army in decision-making.43  Therefore, “while the ‘leaders of Mao’s 
generation were willing to use force to serve China’s security, and more broadly, foreign 
policy goals whenever necessary…[recently] in most cases, China sent strong warnings 
or protests or engaged in negotiations’ prior to employing armed force.”44 Affirming a 
shift in China’s policy, Deng Xiaoping said, “We need at least twenty years of peace to 
concentrate on our domestic development.”45  China in the early 1990s sought to find 
itself, determining national priorities and dealing with an entirely new power alignment 
The Chinese government response after Tiananmen Square revealed a struggling 
and changing China, responding to international pressure and punishments with good 
behavior, seeking stronger integration and a more positive perception in the international 
community.   The violent oppression of the protestors at Tiananmen Square was 
disastrous for positive Chinese perception worldwide, and reflected a new era in which 
China, to benefit and use the system, must also accept the social and moral 
responsibilities accorded with membership.   The international community response to 
42 Dittmer (2006): 109.
43 Jiang Zemin, Theory on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, (Beijing: Party  
Literature Research Center, 2002): 522.  
44 Scobell (2002): 6. 
45 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: A New Approach to Stabilizing the 
World Situation 3, (February 1984) 
http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol3/text/c1170.html (accessed on 
September 28, 2008).  
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the actions of the Chinese government and PLA were devastating – economic sanctions 
and diplomatic ostracism.  Beijing leadership as a result began even more solidly turning 
the focus inward upon peaceful development, with a renewed “emphasis on ‘peaceful 
evolution’ [that] bespoke a basic reevaluation of the opening policy, leading to the 
formulation of ‘identity realism’: economic opening was profitable and would continue, 
[with]…greater emphasis on patriotic education, including reincorporation of pre-
Revolutionary Chinese history…shift[ing] the focus from glorious communist revolution 
to the foregoing national humiliation [guochi].”46  Economic development and regional 
and global security considerations had officially taken the place of Communist 
revolution.  Capitalism, the enemy of China’s Communist movement in the 1950s, was 
now the movement of choice.  
Post-Cold War, Chinese external relationships were cultivated with a variety of 
countries in the international arena, regardless of ideology or geopolitical positioning: 
“The acceptance and promotion of partnerships among major boundaries reflect an 
attempt on the part of China to redefine its position in the new international strategic 
pattern.  The partnerships also reveal a strategic idea offered by China as an emerging 
major power in the post-Cold War era.47  At this point, considering the Chinese 
relationship with North Korea, particularly the resistance encountered in Pyongyang at 
the mention of internal reform or cooperation with the international system, was 
continuing to place a lot of strain upon the relationship.  North Korea’s nuclear 
46 Dittmer (2006): 102.  
47 Cheng and Wankun (2004): 180.
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declaration in particular, potentially destabilizing the region, terrified a new China 
desperate to maintain regional stability for continued development. 
Chinese-North Korean relations struggled throughout the first nuclear crisis but 
were shored up because China was also dealing with an internal crisis (Tiananmen) that 
had called into question successful transition into the international system.  China 
therefore was not in a position to pressure and punish North Korea in a serious way.48 
Doing so risked Pyongyang continuing irresponsible behavior and doing something to 
punish China for that action.  The destabilization of the shared border or, the worst case, 
the region, was too high a price to pay for China.  As Chinese policy showed a tendency 
toward increased responsibility in the international arena concerning nuclear weapons 
and material by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Pyongyang 
continued in the opposite vein, eventually pulling out of the NPT to pursue weapons 
development.   China as a signatory to the CTBT is a key development, as the Chinese 
government had previously refused to sign the document in order to finish (according to 
the completion standards of leaders in Beijing) their nuclear testing.  It is also 
“particularly significant given the importance China attaches to its nuclear arsenal as a 
symbol of its great power status and as the ultimate guarantor of Chinese sovereignty 
against ‘nuclear blackmail and hegemony.’”49  This new responsibility reflects the 
48 Zissis (2006).  
49 Bates Gill and Evan S. Medieros, “Foreign and Domestic Influences on China’s Arms 
Control and Nonproliferation Policies,” The China Quarterly, no. 161 (March 2000): 68 
http://0-www.jstor.org.bianca.penlib.du.edu/stable/655981 (accessed on September 26, 
2008).
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Chinese understanding of nuclear weapons not just as a method of shoring up superpower 
status, but also that they can be a destabilizing force should they end up in the wrong 
hands.  Just because China has nuclear weapons does not mean China wants other 
countries to have them as well, particularly not their irresponsible partner, North Korea.
Sinuiji Special Administrative Zone: China Says No
China had no problem showing North Korea who was in control when it came to 
the Sinuiji Special Administrative Region.  A growing economic opportunity with high 
hopes on the China-North Korean border, had been developing between the two nations. 
The idea behind this cooperation was encouraging mutually beneficial reform on the part 
of North Korea.  China had contributed to the project, investing as a potential way to 
open North Korean to outside investment and economic reform.  Here, the Chinese 
government tried to pass along to North Korea through joint policy the new feeling of 
responsibility that China espoused in policy.
Demonstrating, though, that little in North Korea had changed, Kim Jung-il 
selected as manager a man known more for his ability to deliver favors to Kim than his 
business prowess, Yang Bin.50  As a response to questionable business practices, China 
jailed Yang Bin, refusing to be associated with this corrupt and irresponsible choice by 
the North Korean government.  Also plausible for severing association with this project 
was Pyongyang’s lack of information given to the Chinese government: This “gives 
50 Scott Snyder, “Beijing in the Driver’s Seat? China’s Rising Influence on the Two 
Koreas,” Comparative Connections, (January 2003): 97, 
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0204qchina_korea.pdf (accessed October 29, 2008).
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credence to views that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have deteriorated 
markedly…as Kim Jong-il has evidently focused his primary time and attention on 
wooing Russian President Vladimir Putin at the expense of relations with Beijing.”51  The 
Sinuiji Special Administrative Region, with its promised economic reforms, stands 
contrary to Pyongyang’s nuclear behavior.  It does continue to shore up the belief that 
North Korea does not want to change in the international system, but rather continue to 
take that system hostage, in a sense, to remain the same country it had always been.  The 
Chinese government could not put up with this behavior.   
Describing the differences evident at the Chinese-North Korean border, a picture 
emerges describing the changes that have occurred on the Chinese side and the lack of 
change on the North Korean side: "thirty years ago, the two sides of the river were 
virtually identical, but now, it seems they couldn't be more different.’  China had 
incorporated tourist sites along its border;52 North Korea had done no such thing, 
remaining ever suspicious and preparing for the next inevitable outbreak of war.53 The 
dismal state of the North Korean economy, the result of continued pursuit of “Communist 
utopia,” is in stark contrast to China’s rapid growth, and speaks to Beijing’s abandonment 
of Marx.54   China sought to work with North Korea in one of a couple areas to encourage 
51 Ibid: 98.  
52 Kevin Platt, “Stone's Throw Away, Worlds Apart,” Christian Science Monitor 89, 
November 30, 1997, http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0930/093097.intl.intl.6.html 
(accessed September 18, 2008).
53 Victor D. Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 124.
54 Platt (1997). 
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reform, and North Korea’s desperation for some flow of income encouraged the 
cooperation of leaders in Pyongyang, but only to a certain extent.  North Korea would not 
change or reform for economic success, whereas China would.  The partnership of one 
very flexible country and one very inflexible nation could not last.  
From Pyongyang With Love: More of the Same
The threat perception in Pyongyang is a cyclical process and North Korea creates 
the conditions that cause increased suspicion. North Korea’s threat perception and 
wariness is heightened in response to the targeting of the global community, and North 
Korea’s continued irresponsible behavior continues to make it a target, which in turn 
raises Pyongyang’s perception of threats, etc.  The cycle just continues over time.  China 
does not want attention drawn to itself for negative or destabilizing action and a solid 
relationship with North Korea could suggest in some way that China agreed with 
Pyongyang’s policies.  Beijing though could not deal with North Korea with ease or with 
a consistent hard-line approach, instead reacting as a result of changing conditions, the 
focus though always being Chinese economic growth.  The risk in dealing with North 
Korea is huge and the danger posed to Chinese internal growth very real, so China had to 
tread carefully when dealing with Pyongyang.  This proved to be a very delicate 
balancing act. 
This tension explains why Beijing was hesitant to take a hard-line approach to the 
North Korean nuclear ambitions.  Instead, China took a more moderate approach in 
dealing with North Korea.  An example of this is Wu Jianmin’s statement that China 
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seeks a resolution through “patient consultations,” and that “evidence that North Korea 
had nuclear weapons was ‘not convincing’. …We have held all along that dialogue is 
more effective than pressure.  To bring pressure to bear is not appropriate now.”55 China, 
familiar with the results of economic sanctions from personal experience after 
Tiananmen, and recognizing that the North Korean economy was barely surviving as it 
was, did not wholeheartedly endorse economic sanctions against Pyongyang.56  China 
could not afford to increase the suffering in North Korea and suffer increased North 
Korean dependency.  China’s reluctance was also the result of hesitancy to allow foreign 
bodies and countries to have influence domestically in North Korea; by extension, this 
implied that perhaps internal issues in China could be dealt with by outside interference.57 
Domestic development and economic growth was also of paramount concern as China 
became comfortable with its position in dealing with North Korea.58  The Chinese 
government did not want to anger the leaders in Pyongyang and so China abstained from 
voting after Hans Blix issued a report to the UN urging North Korea to work with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the General Assembly supported the motion in 
a 140-0 vote.59
55 Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 115.
56 Ibid: 130.
57 Ibid: 115.
58 Ibid:  Michael Mazarr provides a clear discussion of the evolution of Chinese strategic 
goals at this point in Sino-North Korean relations.
59 Ibid: 133.  See also Victor D. Cha and David Kang’s book Nuclear North Korea, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), particularly page 124 for a very thorough 
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Beijing’s attitude toward North Korea increased in tension as China began to 
learn the rules of the game and include itself into the global community.  As China began 
to experience the economic partnership benefits of peaceful cooperation, the Chinese 
government no doubt would have liked North Korea to move in the same direction, 
emphasizing the political and economic benefits of peaceful engagement. This policy had 
a two-fold purpose, stabilize North Korea’s aggressive policies and decrease North 
Korea’s present and future dependency upon China.  Pyongyang disagreed and continued 
their pursuit.  China slowly increased its power in the system,60 and enjoyed the benefits, 
China slowly and incrementally began to put pressure upon North Korea to do the same. 
Beijing did not want to continue to lose face over Pyongyang’s irresponsible behavior. 
China dealt with many different issues in this period, acclimatizing to the 
international system, reevaluating national and international strategic goals, and finally, 
how to balance these new focuses with a waning desire to partner with North Korea. 
China at the beginning of the 1990s was not in a strong enough position to place real 
pressure upon Pyongyang, 61 but this would not always be the case.  
North Korea: Pushing China’s Buttons
A new regional and domestic role for China is revealed through participation in 
analysis of North Korea’s positioning and outward relations during the nuclear crises.
60 Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006): 59.
61 Ibid: 64. 
25
the Six-Party Talks.  China’s new focus for the North Korean alliance is far more 
indicative of desiring responsible membership in the global community, with pragmatism 
playing a far larger role.62  Essentially, “it has become one of China’s important strategic 
tasks to maintain the stability of the international society and the region where it is 
located. China regards international society as the important guarantee of China’s 
national interests rather than a threat to China’s security.”63  The Chinese government 
post-Cold War, recognized that the international system has benefits, and tried to take 
advantage, stating that countries “should seek converging points in their common 
interests, expand mutually beneficial cooperation and work together to take up the 
challenge facing mankind for survival and development.”64  Pyongyang has been 
nowhere near as successful as Beijing in normalizing relations with the European Union 
members and Russia as China develops stronger relations on a global scale.65  This should 
come as no surprise considering North Korea’s repeated irresponsible nuclear actions, 
threatening to destabilize the region and angering nations around the world.     
China furiously responded to North Korea’s nuclear test, changing to an attitude 
62 Hsien and Lee (2001): 321. 
 
63 Qin (2005): 37-38.
64 Jiang (2004): 522. 
65 Yinhay Ahn, “North Korea in 2001: At a Crossroads,” Asian Survey: A Survey of Asia 
in 2001 42, no. 1 (January 2002): 52, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-
4687%28200201%2F02%2942%3A1%3C46%3ANKI2AA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z 
(accessed September 21, 2008). This statement was made in 2002, but the same 
conditions are generally true today. 
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of punishment instead of diplomacy.66  The nuclear tests were a loss of face and a “slap in 
the face.”67 Threats to China’s international and domestic perception at this point were 
unacceptable.  China responded strongly, supporting UN Security Council Resolution 
1718, and imposing sanctions upon Pyongyang, a position China was unwilling and 
unable to take a decade earlier.68  China’s power and perception in the international arena 
is rising, as its relationship with North Korea declines.  Patience also seems to be wearing 
thin among some Chinese leaders with North Korea's aggressive military and failing 
economy, refusing to condone the situation with a personal visit: "A delegation…
including high-ranking [Communist] Party officials…rejected an invitation to visit 
Pyongyang."69  The continued nuclear situation was the straw that broke the camel’s 
back, and Beijing’s annoyance is made clear through policy.  Also clear is China’s new 
role in the international system as a major player.  
China Pushes Back: A Hard-Line Policy for North Korea
Beijing’s efforts to encourage North Korea into a position with a greater stake and 
66 Zissis (2006): 1.
67 Jeremy Paltiel, “China and the North Korean Crisis: The Diplomacy of Great Power 
Transition,” in North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test and Northeast Asian Security, ed. 
Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak, (Ashgate Publishing Limited: London, 2007): 97.
68 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, 
(November/December 2003): 1, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101faessay82604/evan-s-medeiros-m-taylor-
fravel/china-s-new-diplomacy.html (accessed September 3, 2008).  
69 Platt (1997).  Platt in this case discusses the comments of a Chinese government 
worker in Beijing.  
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heightened responsibility reflect China’s growing ability and power when compared with 
the response to North Korea’s first nuclear crisis.  Beijing has been applying pressure 
behind the scenes in Pyongyang to decrease North Korea’s economic and political 
dependence,70 an attitude reversal from the first round of talks in the early 1990s 
regarding North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and program.  China’s effort in the Six-Party 
Talks now is regarded far more highly than in the early 1990s; in particular, this serves as 
an indication of the importance of these talks in Chinese political affairs, Beijing 
assembled hundreds of experts to work on drafts of the agreements.71  China is 
approached as not just an equal power in these talks, but as a very important member of 
talks, a position relished in Beijing.  Additionally, leaders in Beijing encouraged Six-
Party Talk members to provide Pyongyang with face-saving measures to return to the 
talks after negative rhetoric from the United States labeling North Korea as an “outpost of 
tyranny” and Kim Jung Il a “tyrant.”72  China’s efforts have been beneficial, as North 
Korea is more involved in these talks than during the first nuclear crisis in the early 
1990s, even if that involvement leads to more frustration at times than positive results.  
70 Fravel and Medeiros (2003): 1.  The authors discuss Beijing’s hard-line approach to 
North Korean nuclear misbehavior.  Recently, China “had boldly stepped into the fray, 
suspending crucial oil shipments to North Korea, sending high-level envoys to 
Pyongyang, and shifting troops around the Sino-Korean border. …And China has not let 
up the pressure since.”  The article continues outlining the ways China is taking a far 
more involved role in regional and international arenas far bolder than before, an 
indicator of the success of Beijing’s economic reform and development.  
71 Kim (2006): 68.
72 “Rice Names ‘Outposts of Tyranny,” BBC News Channel Online, January 19, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4186241.stm (accessed September 6, 2008). 
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At this time, the beginning of the 21st century, China is described to have made 
“a monumental contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia and the 
world over and the sound development of international relations. Peace and development 
remain the overriding themes of the times.”73  Involved globally now, and gaining 
legitimacy, China focuses on a variety of domestic and international issues at all levels. 
Finally, the most telling sign of the decay of the China-North Korea relationship, 
indications exist suggesting Beijing would be unwilling to support North Korea were it 
attacked by another nation, part of Article II of the 1961 treaty with North Korea.74 
China does not need or want regional instability, particularly as considerable growth is 
the new Chinese theme, nor would the Chinese government ever risk China’s growing 
position to fight a war with little reward for the winner.      
China’s participation in the Six-Party Talks is a key indication of the regional role 
potential for China.  Fairly recently, “President Hu urged relevant parties to continue to 
strengthen coordination and cooperation, push forward the talks and strive for the gradual 
establishment of a mechanism for peace and security in Northeast Asia.” 75 It can be 
safely assumed that this hint toward a mechanism in Northeast Asia, while it could mean 
an encouragement to solidify the Six-Party Talks membership into a formal, permanent 
73 Jiang (2004).  
74 Shen Dingli, “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China,” China Security 
(Washington, DC: World Security Institute, Autumn 2006): 26. 
75 “China, Russia Pledge to Increase Strategic Coordination,” November 24, 2008, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/24/content_10401918.htm  (accessed November 
25, 2008).
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framework, could also mean the development of an organization in which China plays a 
more central, controlling role (see Chapter Four).  President Hu spoke further, indicating 
a strong interest in increased Russian involvement and partnership.76  It is left to the 
reader to wonder if, perhaps, this was merely a reference to a potential new role for the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization to fulfill.  Could this be the case?  It is very unclear, 
and differing Chinese and Russian goals about the future of the Korean Peninsula, would 
seem to make this unlikely.  Despite other similar challenges, Russia and China have 
overcome many impasses in order to work together successfully, succeeding where North 
Korea has failed.  China has learned to compromise in order to accomplish its goals and 
work with others in the current system.  
China’s increased participation in the Six-Party Talks and increasing participation 
in international organizations (governmental and non-governmental), reflects a desire to 
become part of the system while encouraging North Korea to do the same (whether or not 
leaders in Pyongyang want to join). The Talks could not be without China, as Beijing 
convinced North Korea to join and has maintained pressure upon the Pyongyang 
government to prevent North Korea from disappearing.77 It is possible that this may rein 
in some of North Korea’s rogue state actions.78  It is also possible that China’s regional 
76 Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco, Hu Jintao Holds 
Talks with His Russian Counterpart Putin, March 26, 2007, 
http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t306902.htm (accessed September 29, 2008).
77 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear,  
Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2005), 283.
78 Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh, “North Korea: A Rogue State Outside the NPT 
Fold,” Brookings Institute Online, (March 2005), 
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influence is overblown and should not be invested in too highly.  China’s level of 
influence is debatable. 
Beijing does obviously have influence, as one main provider of aid to North 
Korea, although the level of influence is up for debate.  Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill has described China as “key” to the success of 
the Six Party Talks.79  A final point, “who has more potential leverage to bring North 
Korea in line – in ways that could dramatically expand China’s regional influence and 
“space,” if indeed a U.S. troop presence in South Korea proves unsustainable – than 
Beijing?”80  Clearly, China seeks benefit at home by becoming involved in the process 
forcing North Korea to be more responsible.  These benefits come in the form of 
continued economic growth, enhanced international prestige, recognition that China is a 
necessary power player, and a separation of China from North Korea, so China no longer 
has to suffer when Pyongyang’s irresponsible policies are played out.  The Chinese 
government has successfully positioned China as a successful power who will continue to 
play a role far into the future.  
China: External Policy Change, Internal Decision-Making Change
Since 1979 there has been a growing proliferation of differing channels of 
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/0301northkorea_hassig.aspx?rssid=north+korea 
(accessed September 16, 2008).   
79 Interview with Christopher Hill, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China, 9 April 2008, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/04/103376.htm (accessed October 10, 2008).
80 Snyder (2003): 99.  
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discussion where international relations and policy are concerned.  Meetings and 
discussion about various international security topics are held regularly, encouraging and 
opening consultative channels, “decentraliz[ing] the foreign policy network and 
increase[ing] the diversity of opinions reaching the top leaders.”81  The top leadership 
though has become more collectivized.82 Along with the pluralization of global 
involvement and diplomacy, Beijing has experienced a similar phenomenon in the 
decision-making process.  This is a variance from the past when the paramount leader 
possessed total control over the decision-making process, limiting consultations (if any) 
to the few closest, most trusted advisors.  President Hu Jintao does not make decisions 
completely alone as Chairman Mao largely did, but consults other bodies for opinions 
and recommendations.83  The actual effect these policies have upon the decision-making 
process is indeterminable, but the fact remains that they are solicited, reflecting a definite 
change from past policy.  Chairman Mao never felt pressure to even give lip service to 
the process of consultations in decision-making but President Hu Jintao does.  Now, 
“important decisions are made after soliciting opinions from democratic parties and 
people with no party affiliation.”84  This change indicates the growing outward focus of 
81 Shambaugh (1987): 284.  His entire paper presents a very thorough analysis of the 
development of a multilayered national security bureaucracy in the Chinese government.
82 Shambaugh (1987): 284.  
83 Yan Liang, ed., “CPC Solicits Opinions on Government Reform and Leader Lists,” 
Xinhua Online, February 28, 2008, Thursday, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
02/28/content_7682176.htm (accessed October 2, 2008).
84 Ibid.
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Chinese government policy, and a (however superficial) acceptance of the responsibilities 
associated with the international system.
To accomplish its goals, China is opening up in more ways than originally 
anticipated and the effect upon the highest levels shows this.  China now values more 
regional security, economic advancement and prosperity,85 as well as enhancing its 
reputation.  Leaders in Beijing, “openly admit that China’s development goal is ‘a rich 
state and a strong army’ (fu guo qiang bing).” 86  To contribute to the attainment of this 
goal, China began emphasizing the peaceful intentions of the country, saying that a 
growing China does not pose a threat.87  This pronouncement seeks no doubt to prevent 
any anti-China alliances, and to serve as a form of deterrence.  This new direction for 
Chinese government policy manifested itself in relations with other countries as well in 
post-Cold War.
Although China’s relationship with North Korea shifted from that of siblings to a 
parent chastising a disobedient teenager, China still engages North Korea.  Leaders in 
Beijing recognize that they cannot afford not to talk to their neighbor, however unruly. 
Although North Korea is of less importance as a buffer zone and is now more of a 
liability, China maintains the cost of relations to protect regional stability.  So, in a way, 
North Korea remains a high strategic priority on China’s list, but at a much greater cost 
85 For a discussion of the shift in Chinese priorities to valuing economic growth see Harry 
Harding, “Discussion of ‘International Political Economy from a Chinese Angle,’” 
Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (February 2001). 
86 Johnston (1996): 236.
87 Sawyer (2006/2007): 18.
33
and with far more limited benefits.  China has found a far more stable and secure way to 
maintain the strategic buffer zone and concurrently pursue economic growth and 
development – developing relations with Russia in a multi-layered way unlike that of the 
Sino-North Korean relationship.  The Sino-North Korean alliance failed as China rose 
and strategic goals changed.  The Chinese government now set its eyes upon cooperation 
with Russia to attain post-Cold War goals.      
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CHAPTER 3
A Bold Outward Direction: Sino-Russian Relations
When the Cold War ended and the international system began to adjust, China 
assessed the situation and became alarmed at the growth of a uni-polar system.  In 
response, policymakers in Beijing began formulating policies to counterbalance the 
growing weight of the United States in the international arena.  This perspective is best 
described by Yan Xuetong, director of Tsinghua University’s Institute of International 
Studies, who unabashedly said, “the world should prepare for a uni-polar world order and 
a unilateral US global strategy. The US is the world's only superpower, [and] pulling out 
of the ABM shows that they know they don't need to care about what others say.”88 
Spurred on by a desire, at minimum, for continued equal recognition with other countries, 
China began moving in a direction that ideally, over time, would allow the country to 
play a significant regional and international role.  China did not want this role to extend 
only to the political or military arenas, however.
In this new era, soft power can be as powerful as hard power, and should be used 
88 Robert J. Saiget, “China Fearing US Domination in Post-Cold War World, Analysts 
Say,” Agence France-Presse, December 16, 2001, 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01zzq.html (accessed September 25, 2008).
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as often if not more.  According to Yan Xuetong, soft power is “the ability to mobilize a 
country, both internally and externally,” and hard power is defined as military power.89 
The Chinese government has been working hard to increase the presence and power of 
the country globally through alternate methods such as cultural exchanges, language 
study, increasing tourism domestically and abroad, to name a few.  Internally, China has 
continued instituting a strong government to unify the people and encouraging pride in 
the growing nation and its potential, to discourage factions that may wish to cause unrest 
or challenge the status quo.  In developing legal structures internally and regionally with 
neighbors, China also attains the good graces and assistance of other nations, allowing 
the Chinese government to more easily maintain control of the internal population.  In the 
case of border disputes or problems (to be detailed far more specifically in further 
sections), instead of pulling out hard power options, Beijing can engage in dialogue or 
rely upon social institutions to smooth over the tenuous area/issue.  It is with these goals 
in mind that China sought economic development as well, for a prosperous happy people 
with opportunity benefiting from the system is far less likely to fragment and seek a 
change in that system.  Though the system is largely still under development, and should 
not be confused with China’s growing economic power, according to Yan.90  
89 Yan Xuetong, “The Path for China to Increase its ‘Soft Power,’” Brookings Institute  
Online, (March 2005) www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/0301northkorea_hassig.aspx?
rssid=north+korea    (accessed October 7, 2008). 
90 Ibid.  It is interesting to note here though that while economic power differs from soft 
power according to Yan, the Chinese government is utilizing economic growth and 
capitalism as a method of unification for the Chinese people, much in the same way 
Communism and revolution were used previously.
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Also in the post-Cold War period, China began even more swiftly moving in the 
direction of economic pursuits.  After all, even China’s Communist Party has “long since 
discarded Marxist interests as the organization discusses ways of embracing 
entrepreneurs into its membership.”91  A new direction and partnership in the post-Cold 
War era are needed to solidify China’s broader regional focus, the provision of security, 
development opportunities, and regional ties of the non-North Korean type.  Russia 
provided this opportunity, building relations in the post-Cold War era upon a new base of 
equality, seeing China as a partner instead of simply a tributary state part of the 
communist movement and, unlike North Korea, contributing to the stability of the region 
and providing a counter balance to the influence of the United States (a role previously 
filled by North Korea). 
At the end of the Cold War, as the Sino-North Korean relationship took a turn for 
the worse, China’s relations with Russia did the opposite.  Challenged by the collapse of 
the global communist movement, the Tiananmen sanctions and diplomatic isolation, 
China sought a new avenue to begin opening the closed doors of diplomatic relations 
with others.  China found the answer in Russia, a country that had equally experienced 
the collapse of the communist movement and suffered economically.  From Moscow’s 
“most worrisome ideological opponent, China has become in the post-Cold War 
international order a valued strategic partner.”92  From the perspective of the governments 
91 Richard Kraus, “China in 2003: From SARS to Spaceships,” Asian Survey 44, no. 1, 
(January/February 2004): 151.  
92 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China: Brother’s Again?” Asian Survey XLI, no. 5 
(September/October 2001): 798.
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in Beijing, the same sentiment is accorded for the post-Cold War years.93  The 
relationship between China and Russia, initially a politically beneficial relationship, 
developed into a much more demanding and rewarding partnership, with multilayered 
frameworks for cooperation.  
In solidifying ties and taking the first steps toward a regional, multilateral 
apparatus, China and Russia recognized that in order for their countries to function best, 
all abilities should be equal at economic, social, and legal status: “Establishing a 
harmonious society and increasing government political ability mobilization requires 
reform of social institutions to make them compatible with the increase in production 
capacity.”94  Essentially, growth will only continue as long as all elements of a country 
are supportive, contributive, and grow alongside economic progress.  Each country 
worked to improve internally to better growth, but found that even faster, more stable 
growth could be found in partnership.   The Chinese government had long recognized 
that an internally united people would allow for greater continued growth and worked to 
stem the problems associated with minorities seeking change.  Russia and China 
cooperated here with enlightened self-interest, enacting policies to benefit themselves and 
their partner internally.  
China did not stand to benefit alone from this relationship, as Russia too wanted 
to increase its regional and international positioning in the post-Cold War era.  In 1996, 
93 Song Yemin, “Sino-Russia, Russia-U.S., Sino-U.S. Relations, and Interaction among 
the Three,” International Research Exchange Board (IREX), Washington, D.C., 
(February 1997): 14.  
94 Yan (2005): 2.
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with the induction of Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister in Russia, the prior more 
pro-Western policies were dropped in favor of the cultivation of partnerships with China 
and India.  Encouragement of an alliance between the three countries was on the agenda, 
but particularly with China.95  Elizabeth Wishnick, an analyst of Sino-Russian relations, 
describes Russian interests from an interview with Prime Minister Igor Ivanov, where he 
said that Russia has proven to be “[eager] to promote its interests in Asia.”96  In this new 
system, although the recognized superpower was the United States, the potential existed 
for a more extensive multi-polar opportunity.  Other commonalities existed between 
Russian and Chinese policy interests and strategic goals.  Some of these common 
interests included opposition to national missile defense (NMD, mainly American), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) growth, and finally “intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict served to shore up Sino-Russian strategic coordination and military 
cooperation.”97  Russia and China recognized this and seized upon it in their interactions, 
initially politically and eventually in a multi-layered context.  
Increasing trade between Russia and China was one of the goals during the late 
95 Wishnick (2001): 800.
96 Wishnick (2001): 799, Igor Ivanov as cited in Elizabeth Wishnick’s work: Interview 
with Igor Ivanov, Nezavisimaia Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), June 15, 2001: 6.  For 
a discussion of Russia’s rising regional influence, also see Kim Woosang, Kim Yongho, 
and Yang Seung Ham, “Russo-North Korean Relations in the 2000s: Moscow’s 
Continuing Search for Regional Influence,” Asian Survey 44, no. 6 (November/December 
2004): 794–814.
97 Paula J. Dobriansky, “Be Wary When the Bear Sides with a Dragon,” Los Angeles  
Times September 18, 2000, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4522.html##1 (accessed 
October 17, 2008). 
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1990s, stabilizing and bettering ties as well as creating opportunity.  In 1997, for 
example, Russia and China signed an agreement permitting Russian construction of a $3 
billion nuclear power plant in east China.98 Cooperating in markets such as energy, arms 
sales, investment, and the purchasing of property in each country increases the ties as 
well as the exposure each country has in the other.  In 1999, the Asian Financial Crisis 
encouraged both countries to scale down their cooperation, but not end it.  They simply 
had to be more creative to maximize benefit for cost.  This thought process, coupled with 
the increased economic participation, has also led to increased strategic partnerships in 
the security and political arenas.  The encouragement of a multi-polar world where no 
hegemonic power has the ability for singular control (i.e. the United States) is of 
particular concern for both China and Russia.99  In this goal, the betterment of the partner 
can allow the other nation to succeed as well, for if Russia or China rises faster than the 
other, it may create a new hegemonic system, which is not the goal of their partnership. 
So, each cooperates to keep the other partner in check, even while contributing to that 
partner’s global and internal success and stability.  
China and Russia also cooperated in the area of military exercises and arms sales. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, both countries began shifting the focus of their 
political/economic alliance to, slowly, that of a military alliance as well.  China and 
Russia’s goal of countering U.S. influence would be unsuccessful were buildup of 
98 Sergei Blagov, “Russia and China: Friends in Business, But Asian Axis Not 
Imminent,” Asia Times Online, March 11, 1999, http://www.atimes.com/c-
asia/AC11Ag03.html (accessed September 29, 2008). 
99 Ibid.
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military lacking as well.  China’s desire to counter U.S. military hegemony is so strong 
that China, normally secretive even to allies concerning military activities and 
capabilities, has been working with Russia strongly to accomplish this.  The Chinese 
government alone does not share this belief,100 but is characteristic as well of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).  According to an advisor to the Pentagon, “Communist China 
views the U.S. as an ‘inevitable foe’ and is preparing for a military confrontation.”101 
Russia has been selling to China submarines, missiles, fighters, destroyers, and strategic 
aircraft used for “troop movement, air-to-air refueling and AWACS-type duties.”102  This 
cooperation is not only involving the trade of arms.   Military cooperation in the upper 
levels of both countries’ military establishments, lends credence to the idea that this 
partnership is one of strength, with much potential for an even stronger future.  This is 
not to say, however, that the countries will combine forces and fight as one (with united 
strategic goals) anytime soon.  These confidence-building measures are indicators of 
what could be in the future, but what is also not here now.  
Strategic military arms purchases from Russia aid the Chinese in their goal of a 
targeted military buildup, focusing upon being technologically elite and not manpower 
100 This view is up for debate as there are two schools of thought within the Chinese 
government, one viewing America as a threat to be countered and the other seeing 
America as a country to be learned from.  For a discussion of Chinese perceptions of 
America see Scobell (2002): 22-29.  
101  “Expert: China Sees U.S. as Top Enemy,” NewsMax.com Online, September 9, 2005, 
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/9/8/161513.shtml (accessed October 
20, 2008).
102 Peter Brookes, “Sino-Russian Strategic Romance,”Military.com, March 27, 2006, 
http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,92359,00.html (accessed October 10, 2008). 
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buildup in traditional terms: “In the past three years, the People's Liberation Army has 
moved quickly to implement a new military strategy that relies heavily on this kind of 
technological know-how. In the future it even wants to add such high-tech gizmos as 
laser beams to zap U.S. satellites that monitor battlefields, bombs emitting 
electromagnetic pulses that blind missile guidance systems, and computer attacks that 
could put U.S. command networks on the fritz.”103  As China pursues the goals of 
modernization in military terms, its partnership with Russia gives it increased access to 
hardware as well as additional political power from an ally also interested in power of its 
own.  It is harder for the U.S. to criticize Chinese government policy when Russia is 
standing not too far behind.  China’s targeted military buildup is complimented by 
partnership with Russia, and in turn, Russia benefits monetarily from the sales of its 
weapons and machinery.  
When President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, he did so at a time when 
Chinese and Russian concerns had never been so aligned.  Agreements had been signed 
enhancing the economic cooperation and benefit for both countries, building trust and 
creating opportunity for added growth and stability.  Both countries had unstable regions 
seeking independence and both countries desired to maintain internal stability in the (thus 
far) stable regions. China and Russia have supported each other’s regional interests when 
it comes to issues both countries view as domestic concerns not for international 
involvement.  Specifically, “Chinese leaders supported Russia’s effort to subdue the 
103 Matthew Forney, “China’s New Game,” Time Magazine Online, September 23, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501020930-353668,00.html 
(accessed October 23, 2008).  
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Chechnya militarily, and Russia has firmly backed China’s position on Taiwan.”104  Not 
long after this, in 2001, both countries signed the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, 
Friendship, and Cooperation, a significant move toward solidifying positive political 
relations (in 1980 during the Cold War China had refused to renew this treaty).105  
The Here and Now of Sino-Russian Cooperation
The current financial crisis has also encouraged increased cooperation for Russia 
and China, bi-laterally and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  Comments 
from the top leadership in Beijnig support this strategic focus: “Chinese President Hu 
Jintao said [recently] that China and Russia should strengthen strategic coordination at a 
time when the global political and economic structures are undergoing the most profound 
changes since the end of the Cold War.”106  Continuing to show flexibility with changing 
conditions as well as a recognition that the system is changing.  China is playing a role in 
this shift, and is seeking to understand these changes in order to take advantage of them 
for the betterment of Chinese growth and establishment in the world order.  Chinese and 
Russian cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a key example.  The 
next chapter explores the multilateral and multilayered cooperation in the SCO, from 
inception to the present, focusing upon how the organization services China’s new needs 
104 Wishnick (2001): 801.
105 “NPC Ratifies Sino-Russian Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and 
Cooperation,” People’s Daily Newspaper Online, October 28, 2001, 
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200110/28/eng20011028_83335.html (accessed 
October 26, 2008).  
106 “China, Russia Pledge” (2008).
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as well as continuing to serve the purpose of the old strategic concerns.  
44
CHAPTER 4
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Basic History
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization traces its origins to the Shanghai Five 
organization, formed in April of 1996, but could be said to trace back even further to the 
blossoming relations between China and Russia.  The organization was founded 
recognizing three main goals of combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. 
Original members China, Russia, Kazahkstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan, met in 1996 and 
1997 to “strengthen confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions…
[signing] the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on 
Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions.”107  Membership at this time made sense 
in that all states shared a border with China.  In January 2001 Uzbekistan applied for 
membership and joined the Shanghai Five.  The group was officially renamed the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a result, and based its activities upon two main 
documents, the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO and the SCO Charter. 
These basic tenets of the organization are fairly flexible and vague, allowing the SCO to 
adapt to future concerns and deal with current problems.   As membership grew, so did 
107 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Government, Shanghai  
Cooperation Organization, January 7, 2004, 
http://www.fmprc.gov/cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm (accessed November 1, 2008). 
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the purposes and goals of the organization, with specific purposes becoming unclear.   
According to the Charter of the SCO, the organization has various diverse and 
multilayered “goals and tasks”, “principles”, and “areas of cooperation”, all of which 
service all members and reflect the designing hang of China.  The purposes of the SCO 
are: 
“to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness [sic] between 
the member States; to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the 
maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region 
and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic 
international order; to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism 
in all their manifestations, to fight against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking 
and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also 
illegal migration; to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such 
spheres as politics, trade and economy, defense, law enforcement, 
environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, 
transport, credit and finance, and also other spheres of common interest; to 
facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural 
development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal 
partnership for the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and 
improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member States; to 
coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy; to promote 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international 
obligations of the member States and their national legislation; to maintain 
and develop relations with other States and international organizations [sic]; 
to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful 
settlement; to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in 
the 21st century.”108  
Several of the described purposes of the SCO are identical to the Chinese government’s 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, which direct China’s independent relations 
with other countries around the world.  As an establishing member of the SCO, and one 
of the most powerful, China has the ability to shape and direct the future of the SCO. 
108 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, June 2002, http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=96&LanguageID=2 
(accessed September 15, 2008). 
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The Chinese government has, in this design, created an organization that will act in a 
manner similar to that of China itself, and therefore will act to further the goals of Beijing 
in a way that China alone cannot.  Several countries working together in a regional 
organization holds much more potential future power and has far greater ability to 
stabilize a region in desperate need of assistance. 
The principles upon which the SCO was founded uphold priorities similar to that 
of the Chinese government as well.  The principles of the SCO are: 
“Mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States 
and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal 
affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking 
no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas; equality of all member 
States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual understanding and 
respect for opinions of each of them; gradual implementation of joint 
activities in the spheres of mutual interest; peaceful settlement of disputes 
between the member States; SCO being not directed against other States and 
international organizations [sic]; prevention of any illegitimate acts directed 
against the SCO interests; implementation of obligations arising out of the 
present Charter and other documents adopted within the framework of SCO, 
in good faith.”109
The Chinese government has long sought equal treatment when involved in the 
international arena.110  Further, since moving out of prior isolationist policies, China has 
long maintained that domestic issues should be resolved without outside interference, 
from another country or any inter-country organization.  According to Chinese Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing, "It can be imagined and understood that any country should not 
109 Ibid.
110 “Chinese FM: Non-interference necessary condition for harmonious world,” 
NewsGD.com, March 6, 2007, 
http://www.newsgd.com/news/chinakeyword/npc&cppcc2007/200703060040.htm 
(accessed October 1, 2008).   
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interfere in the internal affairs of another country."111  Specific examples where the 
Chinese government maintains this rhetoric is when speaking of Tibet or Taiwan, which 
the Chinese government feels are internal issues to be resolved by China alone.  Within 
the SCO, the main areas of cooperation are:
“Maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region; 
search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, 
including issues arising within international organizations [sic] and international 
for a [sic]; development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly 
counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms 
trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and 
also illegal migration; coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and 
arms control; support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in 
various forms, fostering favorable environment for trade and investments with a 
view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and 
technologies; effective use of available transportation and communication 
infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member States and 
development of energy systems; sound environmental management, including 
water resources management in the region, and implementation of particular 
joint environmental programs and projects; mutual assistance in preventing 
natural and man-made disasters and elimination of their implications; exchange 
of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within SCO; 
development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology, 
education, health care, culture, sports and tourism. The SCO member States 
may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual agreement.”112
These goals are congruous with the membership of the organization, all focused upon 
countries with regional membership, perhaps explaining why the United States was 
denied observer status with the SCO.  
Current membership in the SCO consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, detailed in the beginning of the SCO history. 
There are additional countries that have special status within the SCO and participate, and 
111 Ibid.
112 “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (2002).
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although they have no power within the organization they share certain benefits of 
regional economic and security cooperation by participating. India, Iran, Mongolia, and 
Pakistan have observer status, Afghanistan is an occasional attendee, and Turkmenistan is 
an occasional observer.  Occasional representatives from the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations also attend sessions 
of the SCO.  Belarus has also applied for membership status, however there is no 
guarantee of success due to the country’s location in Europe.  Although the SCO 
meetings include many more countries than the official six member countries, there are 
no official or pending plans to expand the organization.  There is also no legal framework 
currently existing within the SCO design to allow for the admittance of additional 
membership.113  The desire of member states to develop framework for expansion is also 
questionable, as increased membership could make the organization unwieldy and unable 
to accomplish goals or remain focused.
The SCO holds annual summits in rotating country capitals, moving in 
alphabetical order according to the countries’ names in Russian language.114  Summits 
began in China in 2001.  Members have also participated in military exercises called 
Peace Missions.  The first occurred in 2003, phase one in Khazahkstan and phase two in 
China, and the second exercises were held in 2007.  Joint exercises were also held 
between China and Russia in 2005, although outside of the SCO framework.  They are 
113 For a discussion of the SCO’s current enlargement mechanisms (or lack thereof) 
please see Richard Weitz, “SCO Fails to Solve Its Expansion Dilemma,” CACI Analyst, 
September 19, 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4697 (accessed September 24, 
2008).  
114 “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (2002).
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significant, however, because the success of these operations led to increased confidence 
and contributed to increased SCO military cooperation and activity. Russia’s Permanent 
Representative to the SCO, Grigory Logninov in 2006 said the SCO does not seek to 
become a NATO-esque military cooperation organization; however, because the SCO 
serves to protect the security of its members, and is aware of the potentially devastating 
effects of "terrorism, extremism and separatism," member states are required to cooperate 
in military affairs.115  Therefore, military cooperation is basically an extension of 
economic and political cooperation, ensuring that the latter two continue unabated and 
with greater success.
What is the SCO?: Through the Rhetoric
While the SCO’s intentions and plans may be helpful to members, it remains 
ambiguous to outside observers.  This in itself is indicative of China’s involvement, as 
China is not well known for its transparency or clear intentions when making decisions or 
policies.  In this case it works to China’s favor, for the organization is not locked in one 
key direction; rather, it can be molded and changed as needs are to be met over time. 
Evan Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, 
addressed the SCO with more questions than answers: “What does the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization actually do to promote enduring cooperation in this part of the 
world?  Is it a security group? A trade bloc? Something else?  What is the Shanghai 
115 Iza D, “SCO Gets Ready for Joint Military Exercise,” World Student Press Agency, 
August 20, 2007, http://www.studentpa.info/spip.php?article248 (accessed September 18, 
2008).  
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Cooperation Organization members’ vision of their own organization?”116  From current 
constructs, the organization serves its exact purpose – to remain small enough to address 
the concerns of member states while retaining the potential to become a larger, more 
powerful organization in the future.  With an unclear purpose, it leaves every door open 
for new opportunities, projects, communication, and cooperation of any kind.  “What 
should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s agenda be?  Ask a Russian, ask a 
Chinese, ask a Kyrgyz, ask an Uzbek.  You will hear four different answers.  Some want 
to focus on security, some on economics, some on the so-called “three evils,” and others 
on pressuring international non-governmental organizations.”117 This is particularly 
important in the post-Cold War world where states are not the only entities posing threats 
and offering new opportunities for success, be it economic, social, political, etc.  If the 
purpose is indeed to counter U.S. influence in the region, then broad, sweeping goals 
allows the SCO to accomplish this goal in any sphere and through any means necessary, 
assuming the member states can continue to cooperate and accomplish the mission.  Thus 
far the member states have been concentrating efforts on a small scale, slowly building 
confidence between members and allowing the organization to continue to develop in 
accordance with stated goals.  
116 U.S. Department of State, Speech by Evan Feiganbaum, “The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and the Future of Central Asia,” Speech given at the Nixon Center, 
September 6, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/91858.htm (accessed 
September 2, 2008). 
117 Ibid.
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The SCO: China’s New Problem Solving Calculus
“As proven by history, force cannot fundamentally resolve disputes and 
conflicts, and the security concept and regime based on the use of force and 
threat to use force can hardly bring about lasting peace.  It is the common call of 
people to discard the old way of thinking and replace it with new concepts and 
means to seek and safeguard security.  Against this backdrop, the new security 
concept featuring dialogue and cooperation has emerged as one of the trends of 
the times.”118 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which officially assumed form in 2002, 
is hosted in Shanghai, a significant undertaking when one considers that it is the first 
multi-lateral organization to be hosted within China’s borders.  This alone signifies the 
importance Beijing accords to this organization and its future.  It also signifies China’s 
potential influence within the organization as a host country.  As the Chinese government 
began considering such an undertaking, several considerations were at play. After the end 
of the Cold War, and particularly from the mid-1990s, potentially destabilizing non-
traditional security threats began to enter the minds of Chinese policymakers very 
seriously, specifically “terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics 
and human trafficking, environmental degradation, the spread of infectious diseases, and 
118 People’s Republic of China Government, China’s Position Paper on the New Security  
Concept, July 31, 2002, http://www.china-embassy.ch/eng/xwss/t138294.htm (accessed 
September 17, 2008).  It is interesting to consider here George McTurnan Kahin, “The 
Asian-African Conference Ithaca,” New York: Cornell University Press, 1956): 54-55, 
for a discussion of the statement of Chou En-Lai at the Bandung Conference: “We should 
leave aside out different ideologies, our differing state systems, and the international 
obligations which we have assumed by joining this side or that side.  We should instead 
settle all questions which may arise among us on the basis of common peace and 
cooperation.”  It is here wherein one may see the beginnings, in Chinese thought, of the 
justification for an organization like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, although it 
would not be until the 1990s that this line of thought would manifest itself clearly in 
Chinese government policy through the SCO.
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natural disasters.”119 As these issues demanded more and more attention from Chinese 
policymakers, more time was paid considering potential effects.  In the post-Cold War 
era, enemies were no longer clear, and with that came the recognition that non-traditional 
security challenges must be met with non-traditional solutions.  No longer would military 
buildup be enough to deter a threat from making an attack.  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization arose as a result of these new, non-
traditional security challenges, and serves as evidence that China recognizes its national 
security issues to be bound up in international security affairs.120  War was to be avoided. 
For China to continue development uninterrupted, a deepening of the regional security 
blanket was necessary.  A shift was taking place, decidedly downgrading North Korea as 
a strategic buffer zone121 to a regional risk to be managed, giving the buffer zone role to 
the developing Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional organization with the 
potential to wield political, economic, and perhaps one day, military power.  Backing this 
new focus on peaceful development was the power transition in November 2002 from 
Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.  This is the first time such a leadership change has occurred in 
China peacefully, without purges or violence.122  With a new leadership platform, China 
decided to pursue its goal of solidifying regional security issues in the form of the 
119 Evan S. Medieros, “China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism and 
Diversification,” Joint Force Quarterly, Aspen Institute, (2007): 3.
120 Shambaugh (1987): 304.
121 Medieros (2007).
122 Kraus (2004): 149.  
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The creation of a multilateral organization dedicated to resolving current issues 
and challenges in a peaceful, more transparent forum, is in direct line with China’s new 
direction.  In China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the goals for interaction in 
the global community are “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual 
non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”123  China’s involvement in the SCO exemplifies this 
as all members interact with one another as equals in each forum, respect one another’s 
territory through the agreement of non-intrusiveness, and seek to stabilize the region with 
economic, social, cultural, and political cooperation.  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization afforded China an ideal opportunity to 
remedy several issues.  In this new neo-realist world, non-traditional threats posed a huge 
risk.  The attack in New York on September 11th illustrated to every nation just how great 
this threat was, and made clear how necessary unorthodox solutions were in this new 
century.  The cooperation of Russia and China has resolved several issues for both 
countries and provided new opportunities.  However, both recognized that a deepened 
and broader partnership could accomplish the same goals with even greater results. 
China recognized that there were certain issues best handled by the cooperation of many, 
and not the tremendous effort of one.  In the SCO, China seeks to solve several problems 
that could one day threaten (or currently threaten) the strength and stability of China 
internally, as well as continued successful economic development and involvement 
123 Jiang (2004).
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internationally.  This is a fairly well rounded approach, revealing a new outlook for China 
of not only pursuit of national interest, but rather enlightened self-interest, where others 
benefit alongside a rising China.
Combating Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Separatism
To better deal with issues of terrorism, the SCO Anti-Terrorism Center was 
founded in January 2004 and initiated at the following annual SCO meeting the same 
year in June.  Particularly after the attack in New York on September 11th, China became 
very interested in combating potential terrorist attacks and threats multilaterally.  Threats 
in the post-Cold War era are generally of a nontraditional security form and as such 
require different solutions and strategic positioning.  The Anti-Terrorism Center within 
the SCO is focused upon preventing attacks upon all members in the region, to prevent a 
threat from originating in one country, entering another, and destabilizing the entire 
region.124  The 2005 Astana summit meeting in part centered upon dealing with the issues 
of terrorism.  A declaration was issued as a result, stating that the main goals and 
purposes of SCO cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts are that the: 
 “…SCO member states will suppress, within their territories, any attempts to 
organize and carry out terrorist attacks, including those aimed against the 
interests of other states; they will refuse shelter to persons accused or suspected 
in terrorist, separatist, or extremist activities and will extradite such persons 
upon appropriate requests on the part of another SCO State in strict compliance 
with the existing legislation of the Member-States.”125  
124 Additional details regarding the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization can be found on the SCO website at http://www.sectsco.org/fk-
03.html (accessed September 8, 2008).  
125 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Declaration by the Heads of Member-States  
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This implies several levels of cooperation, showing the desired depth and reach of the 
organization.  While the member states are still building confidence between one another, 
no doubt working together to resolve issues of terrorism will contribute immensely to that 
goal.                                       
A looming concern in China is the control of the internal population, preventing 
religious extremism and separatist elements from causing problems.  This concern is 
legitimate, for “regional rivalry and outright animosity not only persist, but have even 
intensified among a populace still significantly fractured according to traditional 
geographical, cultural, and linguistic lines.”126  In several border regions there is growing 
tension, and concern from Beijing, that these areas may cause continued unrest, 
particularly in Xinjiang.  Tibet was dealt with brutally after a protest in March of last 
year, and still remains a part of China proper.  Should Xinjiang decide to agitate 
aggressively enough to seek separation from China, members of the SCO would provide 
China with verbal and similar non-intrusive support to take care of the problem 
internally.  One of the main tenants of the SCO is to allow each member country to deal 
with such issues internally, without outside assistance or involvement.  Keeping outside 
influence out has always been one of China’s main concerns – outside interference in 
what Beijing considers internal affairs (two main examples are Tibet and Taiwan) and is 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, July 5, 2005, Astana, Kazakhstan, 
http://eurasianhome.org/xml/t/databases.xml?lang=en&nic=databases&intorg=9&pid=27 
(accessed September 5, 2008).
126 Sawyer (2006/2007): 26.
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cited as a main security goal for the 21st century.127  No doubt this outlook will continue 
for some time to come.         
Viewing the ethnic minority issues plaguing the Central Asian states, no doubt 
China saw problems in those countries that the Chinese government fears and wishes to 
prevent at all costs.  Chinese investment in these countries, continued policies of 
enlightened self-interest, bettering their stability and independence, both benefit those 
countries and China.  The goal of involvement is, hopefully, the issues plaguing those 
countries will never spread to China or motivate separatist elements within China.128 
Particularly of interest to leaders in Beijing was the potential response from China’s 
Turkic minorities upon the Central Asian states achieving independence.   To mitigate 
this threat, “China’s Kazakh and Kyrgyz population were eventually offered limited 
opportunities to immigrate to newly independent homelands, which dampened the 
potential security threat that they posed.”129  As China has increased involvement in these 
countries, the Chinese government wants to maintain friendly relations, meaning 
“regimes that are happy to allow an open-door policy regarding Chinese economic 
interests and to share Beijing’s definition of which groups constitute security threats.”130 
127 China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept (2002).     
128 U.S. Congress, United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Helsinki Commission), Hearing: “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Changing the 
“Playing Field” in Central Asia,” September 26, 2006: 4.  Dr. Brill Olcott in her 
testimony discusses Beijing’s pragmatic outlook when viewing involvement in Central 
Asia, focused at all times upon the benefit for Beijing.
129 Ibid: 5.
130 Ibid: 6.
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Essentially, as long as the relationships serve China’s interests, they will continue to 
strengthen.           
The Chinese government alone cannot successfully deal with China’s internal 
issues (particularly when the destabilizing force comes from another country), a 
revelatory statement considering China’s prior isolation from the world community.  This 
new policy also demonstrates the shift in the thinking Beijing leaders’ and its reflection 
into policy as China becomes more involved with SCO members, both within and outside 
the framework of the organization.  Through collaboration with the individual 
governments of the Central Asian states, China can help to stabilize their internal issues 
and those plaguing China as well; action is mutually beneficial.  Beijing strongly 
recognizes the current and future potential of increased regional security, which could 
lead to China’s enhanced security and progress, socially, economically, and politically. 
Not only will these goals be accomplished, but also China’s standing in the international 
community and as a regional player will continue to rise.  China does not only want 
increased political power, however, seeking to partner with member states for increased 
economic benefit as well. 
China’s Economic Benefits and Challenges in the SCO
In expanding economic cooperation with Central Asian members of the SCO 
gives to China expanded access to the energy resources of these countries.  In these 
smaller countries, China is competing with Russia to tap into energy reserves, but “to 
some degree, both recognize that the partial pooling of efforts to be to their individual 
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advantage.”131  Although China collaborates with Russia within the SCO, Beijing is in the 
end out to service itself with involvement in Central Asia.  
Trade and investment with the Central Asian states is increasing from China as 
well.  In one particular project, China and Khazakhstan are working together to build an 
oil pipeline, to bring oil from the country into China.  As China develops, it is vitally 
important that progress is not inhibited by an inability to obtain energy resources.  The 
Central Asian countries help the Chinese government allay their fears of this possibility. 
Zhang Deguang, SCO Secretary General, at a June 6th press conference in Beijing, spoke 
of the “great importance” of security cooperation for China within the SCO, detailing the 
establishment of a group “to study cooperation projects, cooperation orientation and the 
implementation of cooperation projects in this sector.”132 Thus far the greatest success for 
China has been through bilateral energy agreements with Central Asian states, however 
studies are being conducted and joint projects are up for consideration which will allow 
member states to cooperate together.  The energy cooperative framework of the SCO is 
still under development, currently working to China’s advantage as members work 
together to increase the vitality of future efforts.  Leaders in Beijing can call upon the 
responsibility of Central Asian states to act in the interest of the SCO and the region in 
partnering with China on energy projects.
The wealth of Russia and China allows Central Asian states to benefit the smaller, 
131 Ibid.
132 Interview with SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang, “Image Improvement,” 
Beijing Review, June 6, 2006, http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-24-e/w-3.htm (accessed 
September 3, 2008).
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less wealthy and successful states to rebuild infrastructure and for other development 
projects, offering credit and financing opportunities.133  In 2003 SCO members signed an 
agreement to work toward an eventual free trade area for SCO members.134  A year later, 
plans were solidified into a directive detailing 100+ specific actions to be taken to ease 
and increase trade between member states. At a September meeting, Wen Jiabao, Chinese 
Premier, described his desires for SCO members.  Premier Wen, 
“wanted members to set as a long-term objective the establishment of a free 
trade area within the SCO; elaborate a series of more immediate measures such 
as improving the flow of goods across the member-states and reducing non-
tariff barriers such as customs, quarantine, standards and transport services; and 
create large projects on economic and technological cooperation, giving priority 
to those in transportation, energy, telecommunication, agriculture, home 
appliances, light industry and textiles.”135  
Premier Wen highlighted several markets where he hopes SCO membership will 
advance, helping both the organization as a whole and, naturally, China in particular. 
Each of those industries is important in China and cooperation will ensure access to good 
and services China needs to continue its rise.  China’s participation in the SCO reveals 
the foresight of the Chinese government, and the continued importance of economic 
growth in the strategic goals of Chinese policy.  Ensuring economic growth is not limited 
to discovering new trade partners and opportunities, but also ensuring the stability of 
133 “SCO Holds Summit on Security, Stability, and Cooperation,” Xinhua/People’s Daily  
Online, August 16, 2007, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6241668.html 
(accessed September 19, 2008). 
134 “From the Regions: China Intensifies Trade Talks,” Bridges Weekly Trade News 
Digest, October 1, 2003, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071024121832/http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-10-
01/story3.htm (accessed September 26, 2008).
135 Ibid.  
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border areas and the region as a whole.  Economic growth does not depend upon the 
internal stability of China alone, but also the external stability of border areas and 
countries in the Asian region.
Border Disputes: A Thing of the Past?
One of the main goals in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is utilizing 
partnerships to stabilize and prevent future border disputes.  China and Russia have 
experienced the benefits, through agreements they have ensured that their 2,600-mile 
border is no longer an area of conflict, as it was intensely “from the 1960s to the late 
1980s.  After squandering scarce funds on border defense and stunting the economic 
growth of their border regions, the two neighbors now are working to settle any 
outstanding issues [and] to deepen confidence-building measures.”136  There is reason to 
be concerned about remedying these expenses to bring Chinese military expenditures 
down for issues able to be fixed with peaceful means.  China has been involved in many 
disputes located in border areas that were dealt with through the use of force or all out 
war:
“According to the data set on foreign policy crises generated by Jonathan 
Brecher, Michael Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Rosen, [China] has been involved in 
eleven foreign policy crises through 1985 and has resorted to violence in eight 
(72 percent), proportionally more than the other major powers in the twentieth 
century.  Comparable figures for the U.S., the USSR, and the UK from 1927 to 
1985 are 18 percent, 27 percent, and 12 percent, respectively.  And according to 
the researchers, the Chinese use of violence has been what they label “high 
intensity,” involving “serious clashes” or “full-scale war.” Second, these crises 
were all located along China’s borders.  Territorial disputes were thus crucial 
136 Wishnick (2001): 807.
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drivers in most of these crises.”137
One goal of an organization like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is to make full-
out war over border disputes a thing of the past, ideally.  Thus far this has proven to be 
true.  China has resolved all of its border disputes with neighbors, not wishing to drain 
resources by becoming involved in an unnecessary conflict.  China’s rising star must 
continue to rise with uninhibited and uninterrupted development and innovation.  China 
accords the SCO with much responsibility and has invested greatly to ensure that China’s 
borders remain stable. With North Korea threatening to destabilize the region, a 
progression described in Chapter One and Chapter Two of this paper, securing all other 
borders and being prepared for whatever Pyongyang may do becomes of heightened 
importance.138
Although Russia and China have resolved a majority of border disputes, two 
islands remain under debate, revealing underlying suspicions and tension despite the best 
efforts of China and Russia.  Tarabarov/Yinlong and Bolshoy Ussuriiskiy/Heixiazi are 
both sought by China and Russia, Russia fearing that the city of Khabarovsk Krai would 
be under strategic threat if the buffer space were lost and China wanted to extend its 
territory.139  Although it is possible that this conflict could be shuffled down the list of 
137 Alistair Iain Johnston summarizes the research results of Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 
Michael Brecher, and Sheila Rosen, in “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” 
in Peter Katzenstein ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World  
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 216-68.
138 You Ji, “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” 
Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 28 (August 2001): 6.
139 Wishnick (2001): 807.
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priorities as Russia and China continue to work together, no doubt some degree of 
tension will continue to plague the relationship.  The suspicion on both sides also 
suggests that despite the best of alliances, it just might not be good enough to prevent real 
conflict.  
Military Cooperation: Joint Military Exercises and Arms Sales
  When the SCO members began to work together on security issues, it was only 
natural that member states would begin collaborating on the level of military events. 
This is not to say that members have jumped in feet first and combined forces, but 
symbolic and real joint measures have been taken since the organization began forming 
in the mid-1990s.  Cooperation in the SCO builds upon initial agreements in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, detailed in the prior analysis of rising Russo-Chinese relations in a 
regional and bi-lateral manner.  Current arrangements deepen military cooperation 
through joint exercises, building confidence and partnership between members.
Despite this successful cooperation, it remains to be seen if the other member 
states of the SCO would rise to its defense in a NATO-like manner were a member state 
challenged militarily by another nation.  At this point in time the alliance is nowhere near 
the level of cooperation and integration, particularly for Russia and China.  Although 
they may host military joint exercises, both countries still act in their national interest and 
not the national interest of the organization as a whole when it comes to armed conflict. 
The SCO is a long way from acting cohesively as a military unit, despite political and 
economic cooperation and progress.  
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For China, a desire to participate in confidence building military exercises with 
others is balanced with traditional Chinese thought regarding China’s national interest. 
President Hu Jintao stated that: 
“We must always follow the guidance of Mao Zedong's military thinking, Deng 
Xiaoping's thinking on building the armed forces in the new period and Jiang 
Zemin's thinking on building national defense and the armed forces, and take 
the Scientific Outlook on Development as an important guiding principle for 
strengthening national defense and the armed forces. We must implement the 
military strategy for the new period, [and] accelerate the revolution in military 
affairs with Chinese characteristics.”140  
The key statement here is the call to prior Chinese strategy and military thought, which 
pulled China slowly away from North Korea and may pull it away, eventually, from 
Russia.  The Chinese characteristic of military development may eventually conflict with 
the Russian characteristics and desires when implementing into policy.  This military 
cooperation has raised eyebrows all over the world as countries debate the intentions and 
purpose of a military component of the SCO.  Donald Rumsfeld, in response to the 
SCO’s 2005 military exercises that there is no reason to panic: “I mean, countries do 
that… We are obviously observing what takes place, but I didn’t see anything in it that 
was threatening…”141  Is this viewpoint correct or is the SCO, and China as a main 
country driving SCO policy, shaping itself as an anti-U.S. force in the region?  What is 
140 People’s Republic of China, 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
“Hu Jintao’s Report: Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous 
Society in all Respects,” Section IX, October 15, 2007, 
http://cxqv.bokee.com/viewdiary.18864038.html (accessed October 1, 2008).
141 “Rumsfeld: China-Russia drill no threat,” China Daily, November 25, 2005, 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/25/content_472093.htm (accessed 
September 18, 2008).    
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the purpose of the SCO in Asia for China?  How does the SCO serve China’s interests? 
The exact purpose of the SCO is up for debate; one element heavily debated is whether 
the SCO serves to counter U.S. influence in the region.  
A 21st Century Anti-U.S. Buffer Zone?
The SCO has repeatedly stated that it is not directed against any country: “the 
SCO is neither a bloc nor a closed alliance, is not directed against any individual 
countries or groups of states and is open for broad cooperation with other states.”142  It is 
often said that the SCO military cooperation could be leading toward the eventual goal of 
providing a balance to the influence of NATO in the region.  This, however, is 
contradicted by the fact that NATO’s Partnership for Peace counts among its members all 
five Central Asian states.143  Member states also repeatedly enforce the idea that the SCO 
is not meant to be a military bloc.  The United States has also played a key role in Central 
Asia.  In Tajikistan, for example, the United States contributed over $40 million dollars 
toward securing the borders once the country regained border security responsibility from 
Russia.  
The SCO is credited with maintaining that the bases established by the US in the 
142 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Department of Information and 
Press, Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, June 7, 2002, Section V, 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/900b2c3ac91734634325698f002d9dcf/cbc1ea4d4c4c826a43
256bd400330c09?OpenDocument (accessed September 15, 2008).  
143 “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Future of Central Asia,” (2007). 
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region are temporary.144  After the U.S. began the war with Afghanistan, these bases 
should be slowly dismantled and removed.  Both Russia and China view the bases as the 
U.S. enforcing its presence in the region, a region where both countries would like to 
exert their influence to tap into vital energy resources.  In Uzbekistan, SCO members, 
particularly Russia and China, are credited with pressuring the government to force the 
U.S. to withdraw troops from the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base.145  The SCO in July 2005 
issued an official declaration calling for the removal of U.S. troops from bases in 
Uzbekistan.  By the end of 2005 U.S. forces were completely withdrawn from 
Uzbekistan.  Although the SCO’s influence can be debated (some say the SCO 
declaration only hastened an already made plan for U.S. removal146), the SCO did have 
some influence.  Increasingly the SCO has been putting influence upon its membership to 
act to benefit the SCO as a whole, lending credence to the potential future (more 
powerful) presence of the organization in the region.  These actions are only in the 
beginning stages, however, as American influence is still present in the region and the 
power of the SCO as a whole is still being established.
The removal of U.S. troops from Uzbekistan is the beginning of a hoped rollback 
of American influence from the region, allowing China and Russia (both bi-laterally and 
144 Ibid.
145 Lionel Beehner and Preeti Bhattacharji, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 
Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, April 8, 2008, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/ (accessed September 30, 2008).  It is worth noting, 
however, that the authors note that although the SCO pressured Uzbekistan, relations 
between the U.S. and Uzbek governments were already in bad shape.
146 Ibid.
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multilaterally within the SCO) to fill the void.  Russia is said to be “[operating] [u]nder 
the working title "Creeping Expansion Of Mysterious And Unpredictable China" on one 
side, and "Concerns About the Aggressive Policies of the United States in the Region" on 
the other, [and] is strengthening its cooperation in the military-political and military-
technical spheres in the framework of such alliances as the CIS and CSTO, especially 
with the countries of Central Asia.”147  Increased influence from Russia and China in the 
region will help Uzbekistan (money can be extended from the SCO for regional 
development projects) as well as giving Russia and China access to Central Asian energy 
resources.  Finally, the Central Asian states can provide a strategic buffer zone for China 
as American influence declines.  The Asian Times quoted David Wall from the 
Washington Times, as saying that "an expanded SCO would control a large part of the 
world's oil and gas reserves and [a] nuclear arsenal. It would essentially be an OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] with bombs."148  While this perspective 
may be alarmist, it may also be accurate in its forecasting of the future of the SCO. 
Unfortunately, a clear answer will have to wait until the organization develops further. 
Uzbekistan appears to be, for the SCO, the “steering country,” allowing the SCO to 
demonstrate its will through Uzbek action.149  So, perhaps the SCO in this case is 
147 Sultan-Khan Zhussip, “Russia Expands Its Military Presence in Central Asia,” Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty, November 12, 2008, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Expands_Its_Military_Presence_In_Central_Asia/13
48368.html (accessed October 28, 2008).  
148 Daniel Kimmage, “Iran and the ‘OPEC with bombs,” Asia Times Online, June 15, 
2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/middle_east/hf15ak01.html (accessed October 2, 2008). 
David Wall is professor at the University of Cambridge's East Asia Institute.
149 Akihiro Iwashita, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Japan: Moving 
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providing China and Russia the necessary camouflage needed to accomplish their 
national goals in the name of regional security and the SCO.  
Also lending credit to the anti-U.S. influence in Asia line of thought, is the 
presence of Iran at meetings as an observer nation.  Both China and Russia have had 
long-term relationships with Iran on a bilateral level, dealing both economically and 
militarily.  These relationships have come under fire recently due to Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.  It is worth noting here that both Russia and China have been hesitant to 
embrace Iran fully at the meetings and are even more hesitant to consider the country for 
permanent membership in the SCO, thus mitigating the anti-U.S. nature of Iran’s 
involvement.  China in particular is of concern because allowing Iran to join could cause 
“China’s original interest [in the SCO] – to neutralize its western neighbors – will not 
have been lost but submerged amid other issues.”150  This is of particular concern with 
SCO expansion for China – that the Chinese not lose their influence over the direction 
and future of the organization.  Allowing Iran entry could have that cost with unequal 
benefit.  Finally, “China and Russia are wary of making Iran a full member on the 
grounds that Iranian membership could give the SCO more of an anti-American tone.”151 
It is worth adding here that it would give the SCO an overt anti-American tone, for Iran is 
not shy about speaking negatively about American presence and influence in the region. 
Together to Reshape the Eurasian Community,” Brookings Institute, January 28, 2008: 2, 
www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/0128_asia_iwashita.aspx (accessed November 1, 
2008).
150 Beehner and Bhattacharji (2008): 2.  
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Russia and China in the SCO have been far more hesitant to target the U.S. directly in 
communiqués, instead characterizing their regional organization as directed against no 
one state.  
The 2005 declarations for U.S. troop removal in Central Asia are as pointed as the 
SCO gets when it comes to anti-American rhetoric.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
consider the exact wording of the 2005 Astana Declaration:
“We support and will continue to provide our support to the efforts of the 
international coalition that carries out the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. 
Today we note the positive dynamics in the stabilization of the internal political 
situation in Afghanistan.  Some SCO member-states have provided their on-
ground infrastructure for the temporary deployment of the coalition troops, as 
well as their territory and air-space for the purposes of military transit in the 
interest of the antiterrorist operation.  Taking into account the completion of the 
active combat phase of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the SCO 
member-states consider it necessary that the relevant members of the 
antiterrorist coalition take a decision on the deadlines for the temporary use of 
the abovementioned infrastructure facilities and military presence on the 
territory of the SCO member-states.”152
Some perspectives support that the SCO does not pose any threat to the U.S. 
According to Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, stated that, “Today, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not 
pose any direct threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia or in the region more generally, 
although its annual meetings have, most particularly in 2005, become an opportunity for 
member states of that organization to vent their frustration with the U.S. in general and 
U.S. critiques of their non-democratic political systems in particular.”153  
152 Declaration by the Heads of Member-States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (2005). 
153 U.S. Congress, United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
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Is the SCO directed against the U.S. because of these actions or could there be 
another reason for U.S. suspicion?  The United States often laments the lack of 
transparency from China (and the SCO) as one reason for concern about the 
organization’s potential anti-U.S. intentions.  However, one familiar with Chinese 
philosophy will know that “virtually all military writers from Sunzi [sic] (Sun-tzu [sic]) 
onward stressed the need for secrecy, pondered its nature, and articulated highly 
sophisticated measures for its preservation.”154  Although referring here to specifically 
military planning, this theory has embedded itself into Chinese government and public 
life as well.155  There is some concern from the United States that China’s military 
buildup, and the joint military exercises of SCO members, may be an element of an anti-
U.S. strategy.156  In this statement lies the possibility that Russia and China created the 
SCO to have a viable and valid platform for voicing their concerns about U.S. uses (or 
abuses) of power, essentially a legitimate forum for discussion; one the U.S. would have 
to pay attention to and which has legitimacy in the international arena.  The actual anti-
U.S. intentions of the SCO are as vague as its mission and intentions, but it does allow 
China the opportunity to meet with like minds and discuss ways to develop their power at 
the expense of the U.S., both in the Central Asian region and potentially globally.  
Organization Changing the “Playing Field” in Central Asia, September 26, 2006, 
www.carnegieendowment.org/files/MBO0906.pdf (accessed November 2, 2008).   
154 Sawyer (2006/2007): 3.  
155 Sawyer (2006/2007): 4.
156 For details about U.S. government opinions regarding Chinese buildup of military 
capabilities, please see the 2005 and 2007 Annual Report to Congress. 
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It is key to note that in all Chinese philosophy concerning international relations, 
emphasis is placed upon thinking and planning long term; compare that drawn out 
strategy with the more western short-term planning style, at times only weeks ahead.157 
As a result, this could be a factor complicating U.S. perception of Chinese strategy and 
action post-Cold War.158  China brings this strategy to the SCO as well, focusing upon 
slowly and carefully managing the buildup and growth of the organization.  With this 
focus, Beijing can maximize individual benefits as well as broader organizational 
benefits.  The SCO itself has continued to affirm its planning is peaceful and not pointed 
against any specific entity, successfully maintaining vague policy goals and upholding 
the Chinese virtue of secrecy.
Conclusion
While the methods of achieving Chinese strategic goals may have changed, at the 
heart of all the changes lies an interest on the part of China to hedge U.S. influence in the 
region (and global community), solidify economic growth, continue to seek a strong 
China and a multi-polar world, and in all cases, act in the national interest of the Chinese 
state.  The priorities of the Chinese government have shifted over time, from uniting in 
the defense of North Korea and the Communist movement to presently developing a 
157Shambaugh (1987): 277.
158 The perceived anti-U.S. elements of Chinese strategy could simply be a 
misunderstanding of strategic thinking.  This paper will not consider this topic in depth, 
but for a comparison of U.S. and Chinese strategy see David L. Shambaugh, “China’s 
National Security Research Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly, no. 110 (June 1987): 
277, http://www.jstor.org/stable/654000 (accessed on September 30, 2008).   
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multilateral organization with much potential to wield power in several different parts of 
Asia.  Chinese relations with North Korea are currently strained and full of tension 
regarding several topics, but are absolutely necessary to maintain for the strength and 
stability of the region.  Paying this price to maintain Chinese growth outweighs the risk 
posed by a North Korean collapse.  As China’s priorities changed and the relationship 
became more of a liability, China found a new mutually beneficial relationship with its 
neighbor in the north, Russia, to pursue a capitalist revolution at the expense of the old 
Communist ideology.   This relationship deepened and expanded into the SCO.
The Russia-Chinese partnership has a foundation, which, thus far, has carried the 
relationship fairly well through the challenges in the 21st century.  Chinese strategic 
priorities of border security, maintained economic growth, pursuing targeted military 
development, and energy security, to name a few, are well served through cooperation 
with the Russian government since the end of the Cold War.  Where the relationship is 
weaker, however, lies in the underlying tensions in the relationship, particularly mutual 
suspicion on the part of both the Russian and Chinese governments, each wondering what 
the other would do as a strong power in a world without U.S. hegemony.  
Despite these suspicions, their partnership continues due to the high mutual 
benefit.  Although “China and Russia aren't perfect strategic partners…their concerns 
about American global power, EU/NATO expansion, more Orange/Rose/Tulip 
revolutions and Japan's higher international profile, are encouraging the long-time rivals 
to give each other a second look.”159  It is this underlying mistrust in particular that will 
159 Brookes (2006).
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inhibit complete cooperation between the governments, in particular intelligence sharing 
and military cooperation.  However, the relationship is currently beneficial for both and 
will continue strongly in part due to the countries joint founding of and involvement 
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  This organization makes it all the more 
important for Russia and China to maintain healthy relations.
As China deepens its relationships with member states in the SCO, and ponders 
partnership with other regional states, at the core of strategic considerations is China’s 
national interest.  For China, the SCO is a growing buffer zone in Asia against 
international interference in the region and internally, a forum where concerns can be 
voiced and policies enacted that are not exactly in line with the current norms of the 
international system.  Is China creating for itself an organization with the potential to 
wield power in the region or on a global scale?  Or is the SCO developing so strongly due 
to the fact that it offers so many opportunities to satisfy Chinese strategic goals in the 21st 
century?  Unfortunately, a clear answer to these questions still cannot be accessed.  The 
SCO must be watched closely as it develops, particularly Chinese involvement, to 
ascertain a clear idea of China’s future goals in the SCO.
The SCO is still taking shape, so the answers to these questions are as uncertain as 
China’s future positioning in the international arena.  The future of the Russo-Chinese 
relationship is also uncertain.  Could relations eventually become as strained as Chinese-
North Korean Relations?  Absolutely, it could happen; but with foundations stronger than 
that of the Chinese-North Korean relationship, the future looks much brighter.  The future 
should be brighter as long as Russia continues to satisfy the concern at the heart of 
73
China’s strategy – the continued strength and growth of the Chinese nation, satisfying 
new challenges and priorities with ancient strategic foundations and economic growth.  
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